Rustle in the Bush

From ‘On the Emendation of the Intellect’

A. The Four Kinds of Knowledge

SO now (After the first 17 sections) we can look at the modes of perception which don’t allow for doubt, of which there are 4. Quote “

1. There is the perception we have from report or from some conventional-sign.
2. There is the perception we have from random experience, that is, from experience that is not determined by the intellect. But it has this name only because it comes to us by chance, and we have no other experience that opposes it. So it remains with us unshaken.
3. There is the perception that we have when the essence of a thing is inferred from another thing, but not adequately. This happens either when we infer the cause from some effect or when something is inferred from some universal, which some property always accompanies.
4. Finally, there is the perception we have when a thing is perceived through its essence alone, or through knowledge of its proximate cause.”

Examples:

1. My name, where my parents were born, which we don’t doubt
2. How we know useful things. Ex include, knowing oil feeds fire, a dog is a barking animal, that I will die, which I all observed
3. When we perceive such a body and no other, we infer that the soul is united to the body. The union is the cause of this sensation but we don’t have absolute knowledge of the sensation and union (Whether or not they are one is a separate question, metaphysically). The other example is knowing the nature of vision and why things appear smaller when we look at them from a long way away.
4. The fourth kind means that when we know something, we know what it means to know it because it is perceived through its essence. Like the union of soul and body, and that 2+2=5.

Since knowledge admits the connection of the mind and the body, the goal of knowledge is the perfection of mankind insofar as he is a part of the expression of God (perfection). The means necessary to this end, according to Spinoza, are:

“

(1) To know exactly our nature, which we desire to perfect, and at the same time

(2) [To know] as much of the nature of things as is necessary,

(a) To infer rightly from it the differences, argreements, and oppositions of things

(b) To conceive rightly what thyt can undergo and what they cannot

(c) To compare (The nature of things) with the nature and power of man.

Report {Perception 1} no, essentially hearsay. No grounding for these claims, discount from science. Doesn’t infer directly the essence.

{p2} is discounted because in this case all we can infer are accidents.

{p3} This third way yes we can infer an idea of the thing and that we can infer without risking error but it is not a means as attenting perfection

{p4} Only this does it without the risk of error.

B. Acheiving Clear and Distinct Ideas

The end of achieving c+d ideas is to grasp them from the pure mind, not the ‘fortuitous motions of the body’. Spinoza then says we order these ideas one by one back to order, to objectively represent the formal character of nature. This bit is a little unclear.

We have two categories of knowledge assisting the ends of perfection in man. A causa Sui, in which a thing is its own cause, so we know its essence through itself alone, and things which require a cause to exist, which qualify as knowledge through their ‘proximate’ cause.

1st part of method: Therefore, if we want to investigate things (Spinoza’s definition of science), we don’t mix things only in the intellect with those that are real (This doesn’t imply Cartesian dualism though; probably explained through the modes). We either get thing-knowledge through legitimate definitions or affirmative essences. ‘Universal axioms (In thing knowledge) cannot determine singulars because they point towards infinities’

So “The right way of discovery is to form thoughts from a given definition”.
Therefore, the second part of the method is knowing the conditions of a good definition, and then, the way of finding good definitions

Conditions of definition: To not use propria (In old school logic these are not the essential things but essentials which follow form this main thing; i.e. man is capable of laughter but it isnt his defining essence) This doesn’t apply to abstract examples (Such as a circle’s lines form the center all being equal; its a moot point yet still essential). Physical beings (As against ‘beings of reason’) suffer tragically in definition if we don’t have a clear and distinct essence.

Here’s Spinoza’s definition requirements of created things:

1. If the thing is created, the definition will have to include its proximate cause.
2. The concept ot definition, when isolated, allows for all its properties to be duduced from its definition

Definition requiremnts of eternal things:

I. The exclusion of all idea of cause–that is, the thing must not need explanation by Anything outside itself. (It’s one being is explanation)

II. When the definition of the thing has been given, there must be no room for doubt as to whether the thing exists or not.

III. It must contain, as far as the mind is concerned, no substantives which could be put into an adjectival form; in other words, the object defined must not be explained through abstractions.

IV. Lastly, though this is not absolutely necessary, it should be possible to deduce from the definition all the properties of the thing defined.

Through these, we derive particular ‘affirmative’ essences. So the more certain, is more distinct, therefore, we seek knowledge of particulars as much as possible.

I think that Spinoza’s focus on the way we construct definitions allows him to forgo some problems that might be misconstrued from an immediate glance at his substance monism and claim that we can have absolute knowledge flowing from these ‘purely’ metaphysical definitions. It is refreshing to see that he believes knowledge of particulars is of the utmost concern, and not reliance on universal abstracted essences, that is to say, particulars furnish absolute knowledge as well.

Then, we determine if there is a being which causes all things, and the nature of this cause allows us to order our knowledge of particulars in the right way. For their existence has no
connection with their essence, or (as we have already said) is not an eternal truth. This is a fairly classical understanding; it’s a straightforwardly rational approach.

Gonna be honest. I’m getting lost in the last few sections because while I understand that we don’t understand the series of eternal things like a set, there is trouble in adhering to the wealth of information from these observations. It seems as if this is contradicted by Spinoza’s admission that we really need only the knowledge of the eternal fixed things.