Rustle in the Bush

On the Possibility of Ataraxia as Eudaimonia in the Work of Sextus Empiricus

Unique among the philosophers of the Hellenistic tradition are those of the Phyrronian skeptical schools. It is precisely because these groups of thinkers refused to refer to themselves as a school (For heuristic reasons), does one find an opportunity for curiosity. It is certainly more than the interesting life events of Pyrrho himself, who traveled alongside Democritian skeptic Anaxarchus with Alexander the Great into India and beyond. It is a life supposedly proliferated in emotional indifference and intellectually dependent on contradiction that prompts one to consider the ethical repercussions of such a method. While working with other concepts common to the Hellenistic period (Those of schools such as the Peripatetic, Stoics, and Epicureans) the Pyrrhonian skeptics at first glance then appear to leave a lacuna in their thoughts regarding moral conduct in their refutations of the ‘Dogmatists’. 

If the Skeptics truly claim to ‘suspend all judgment’ it is unclear if this train of thought is even possible for a human being, who seemingly utilizes judgment in order to make decisions possible. If one cannot make a judgment and therefore a choice in order to better or worsen one’s self, it is not immediately clear what vision of either happiness or fulfillment is available to the skeptic. By suggesting that the Skeptical notion of ‘atarxia’ (Often translated as mental tranquility) as developed by Pyrrohian Sextus Empiricus, is the guiding ethical principle of skeptic thought, and through contrasting it with the virtue-based eudaimonistic theories of Plato and Aristotle, it is possible (Perhaps against the Skeptic’s wish) to determine the ethical aspect of skepticism as eudaimonistic. 

Sextus Empiricus was a philosopher who is known as having the title of ‘Pyrrhonian’. In this title he follows the Pyrrhonian nomenclature, conducting himself as investigative (Zetetic), in a suspensive state of mind due to the nature of this investigation (Ephectic), and finally as neither affirming nor negating a specific proposition (Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrronism, 7). In this, the skeptic philosopher discovered the telos of her process of inquiry as ataraxia, or “Quietude in respect of matters of opinion and moderate feeling in respect of things unavoidable” (Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 25). Thus, the skeptic finds herself in a consistent state of inquiry, due to this so-called doctrine of incomprehensibility. Most of Sextus’ discussion consists in refutation of the various schools in his time, and many of his arguments are polemical in their directedness towards their opponents. This allows for a more explicit refusal of epistemological and metaphysical concerns in other schools, yet undermining the more practical implications (I.e. Ethical considerations for at least the skeptic themselves) within the skeptic view. 

It is the content of belief that Sextus feels is lacking in a dogmatic or strictly ethical position. Without being able to affirm or negate the nature of good or evil, the non-skeptical individual generates feelings opposite to the end goal of being Zetetic: a disheveled state far from being ataraxic. Joseph Bullock provides 2 popular accounts for considering this process in terms of eudaimonia, in which the first consists in the fact that, 

“Ataraxia is constitutive of eudaimonia in other ancient ethical theories” (Bullock, 20) and concluding that it must be the same with Sextus Empiricus. This first argument is easily dismissed with an association fallacy. The second and more convincing one is found in some of Sextus writings where he admits that one who does not hold propositions as being positive or negative, is more easily

This epistemological distance from a claim on the ‘nature’ of any proposition allows for a skeptic to avoid the pitfalls of dogmatism. These pitfalls are the dogmatic philosophy itself, some philosophy which claims to have discovered an element or whole of the truth, and disrupting the horizontal aim of that which is ataraxic, which is “The course of opposing to every statement an equal statement” (Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 18). Bullock concurs in that there is no ‘ultimate’ end for Sextus and that he is not making a universal claim on human nature here,

“Sextus is not arguing for the “goal of life” that everyone pursues or ought to pursue. Rather, he is presenting what the skeptics go for as a matter of fact. If this reading is plausible, it would also suggest that ataraxia is not the ultimate end for everyone; it is merely the limited end for the skeptics. It is what the skeptics pursue” (Bullock, 34). He adds nuance to this position by noting that the beginning of a skeptic, or the skeptic’s experience is in hope of tranquility, and ataraxia is simply where they would end up.

Ancient Greek scholar Svavar Svavarsson identifies a historical interpretation of the skeptics ethical accounts in terms of it’s relation to Pyrrho himself and the schools in which a skeptic revival took place “He (Philo, leader of the Academy 110/09 BCE) rejected the skepticism of the Academy in its entirety and turned to Pyrrho as the founder of consistent skepticism”. It leaves open a historicist method of interpretation in which Pyrrho becomes an institutional figure for the method of refutation that characterizes Pyrrhonian thought. Namely, the ten modes of thought. Diogenes Laeutius in The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, recounts the actual life circumstances of Pyrrho and therefore an account of an ethical skeptic. He was described often so indifferent to outside circumstances, even to seemingly hyperbolic degrees, “His life corresponded to his principles; for he never shunned anything, and never guarded against anything; encountering everything, even waggons for instance, and precipices” (Laeutius, 402) reminiscent of Stoic accounts of indifference. These facts lead to a historicist integration of Pyrrhonism in which Phroo served as a model skeptic for the arguments introduced in the time of those in agreement, and his argument leaves open the possibility for new skeptics to become exemplars against their contemporaries.

It is considering this interpretation that Aristotle on the other hand, makes claims that would not fit within the aforementioned ethical description, though it first serves to give an outline of his theory. Aristotle seeks to provide an objective account of his moral outlook, in what is often called moral realism. In his oft cited Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle attempts to provide an objective account of virtues in order to make substantive claims about a life judged in terms of eudaimonia as the ultimate goal of life. As Aristotle himself states that “Practical wisdom… is concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since the thing to be done is of this nature” (Aristotle, 99). 

In this definition, Aristotle suggests that the real existence of virtues supplants ethical concerns by moving past the question of whether we are moving ‘to or from the principles. Aristotle does not naively equate the good with pleasure, but establishes an argument in which a balance of virtue is necessary to achieve the good. Therefore, for Aristotle, virtues are integral aspects of character that allow one to approach eudaimonia. By balancing different kinds of virtues such as justice, magnanimity, and courage, excess and deficiency is avoided and the flourished (Balanced life) is actualized.

Part of what is unique about Aristotle is that same commitment to his universal principle. This allows for Aristotle to substantiate his claims for humankind generally, and to craft a human nature which demonstrates itself as the tension between two ends of virtue. Without this kind of human nature, Aristotle would be left relativistic, though ultimately his focus on reason and argument allow for ethical considerations that hold true across all of humankind, and not just for a singular individual. Within the deliberation of his system, Aristotle uses these definitions to justify an account of justice as one of the most important aspects in ethics.

To begin to describe the differences in Aristotle’s and Sextus Empiricus’ views of eudaimonia is to describe their relations to the criterion of truth and substance. Aristotle provides a substantial ethical framework which seeks to mitigate relativism because “Substance is prior in nature to the relative… so that there could not be a common Idea between these goods” (Aristotle, 7). By attempting to supply  a rigorous framework to his metaphysics and logic Aristotle’s attempts to further his ethical claims with an indefinitely true method represent a rigid framework unfamiliar to the skeptic who claims to do nothing by nature. This also means the skeptic provides no ‘real’ or substantial judgment on appearances or the nature of moral considerations such as good and evil. These specific developments of Aristotle’s system lie in his consideration of values, and the weight he ascribes to their relation to a human nature, which a skeptic would not begin to propose a positive or negative judgement.

There is a rather dull fact in the argument of Sexts that refutes these explicitly eudaimonistic tendencies rooted in Aristotle’s examples. This would be the fact noted in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that, “Sextus does not have a lot to say in a positive vein about virtue” leading to the conclusion that, “This alone would seem to be enough to disqualify Pyrrhonism as a form of eudaimonism” (Parry and Thorsrud, SEP). The skeptical framework, particularly through then ten modes of thought, combats this substansiveness of Aristotle’s eudaimonistic account by allowing the introduction of a relativism which is put forth by Sexrus as such, “ The Eighth Mode…. We shall conclude that, since all things are relative, we shall suspend judgement as to what things are absolutely and really existent” (Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 135). To rephrase, Sextus denies the substantial existence of a ‘true nature’ that determines the perfect representation of good and evil. If this sounds tautological, it is because it disregards the suspension of judgement that defines the skeptical system.

In accordance with what has been stated it appears shaky at best to describe an ethical system in terms of Pyrrhonism due to the nature of the epoche or “suspension of judgment’ as the Greeks may have understood it. It would appear at first glance that it is not possible for a singular individual to craft judgements which allow them to move through their life as acts of principle, or out of any profound sense of ‘nature’. By examining this principle through another notion unique to the Greek ethical landscape of the time, eudaimonia (Fulfillment or flushing in the context of life) it is possible to sketch an architecture of ethics in the skeptical vein. By comparing the conception of eudaimonia in the work of prominent ethical theories Aristotle, it is possible to see the possibilities of ataraxia being considered within a eudaimonistic framework.

However, in the end, the consequences of Sextus Empiricus’ skepticism are framed through reluctances in making substantive ethical claims. The advocacy of fixed moral positions is not a doctrine which would be supported by the likes of a Pyrrhonist. Though ataraxia defines a hopeful light on the negative aspects of doubt through a purification in terms of undisturbed ness, it leaves a gap on the more practical aspects of morality. By constantly raising doubts about the nature of human conduct, a skeptic in the vein of Sextus Empiricus seeks to undermine the model put forth by Aristotle in relation to this judgment on human nature.

Works Cited

Aristotle. The Nichomachean Ethics. Translated by W. D. Ross, Oxford University Press, 1983. 

Bullock, Joseph B., “Sextus was no Eudaimonist.” Thesis, Georgia State University, 2008.

Empiricus, Sextus, and R. G. Bury. Sextus Empiricus: In Four Volumes. Harvard University Press, 1933. 

Laeutius, Diogenes. The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers. Project Gutenberg, Updated October 4, 2023, https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epubs/57342/pg57432-images

Parry, Richard and Harald Thorsrud, “Ancient Ethical Theory”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=<https://plato.stanford.edu/arc hives/fall2021/entries/ethics-ancient/>.Svavar Hrafn Svavarsson, “Two Kinds of Tranquility: Sextus Empiricus on Ataraxia”,  Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy (pp.19-31), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226262888_Two_Kinds_of_Tranquility_Sextus_Empiricus_on_Ataraxia